How it works
Charterion in ten minutes
Start at the instant an agent is about to change a business record. It puts the action to the enterprise model and receives one of four answers. Everything else in Charterion exists so that the answer is possible, rests on evidence and traces to a human. This page follows that moment outward. The full specification can be read on the home page.
01
The model has a new reader
For decades the enterprise model has relied on a reader who fills its gaps: an architect who finds no payment queue in the model assumes one exists. TOGAF and ArchiMate, the frameworks that produced that model, were built for that reader and did that job.
An agent is a program that takes a goal, plans steps and calls operations on the organisation’s resources, under authority the organisation conferred. It cannot fill a gap from experience as the architect did: it acts on the wrong object, or does not act. Charterion makes the enterprise model an authority substrate, the source an agent consults at the moment of acting and the thing that answers it. The architect stays, as the author of the authority the agents exercise.
Established
- Enterprise model, as documentation
- Read by architects and stakeholders
- A decision
- Projects and people act
Months later the estate is re-documented. Staleness is absorbed by the reader.
Charterion
- Enterprise model, as authority substrate
- Consulted by the agent at the moment of acting
- One of four answers: may this agent do this, here, now?
- The agent acts or escalates
Evidence returns to the model that authorised the action.
Specification v2.0, PDF pp. 4‑33
02
The questions the enterprise model must now answer
Before acting, an agent asks
- Anchor
- Does the thing I intend to act on exist, and is it the one I mean?
- Affordance
- Can the action be performed on it, through what, and with what consequence?
- Envelope
- May I perform it, and where must I stop?
- Coordination
- With whom or what am I sharing the estate I am about to change?
- Warrant
- How far can I trust the answers I have just been given?
About an agent, an architect asks
- Which human is accountable for this agent’s write access?
- Which two agents may act on the same record without any declared coordination?
- Which of this agent’s entitlements exceed any need the architecture can justify?
- On which machines, through which tools and AI models does this agent act, and can the person who oversees it stop it there?
The fourth architect question is new in version 2.0. It is answered by the part of the model that describes where agents run: the machines that host them, the tools they call, the AI models that drive them and the controls that stop them. It is optional; the rest of Charterion can be adopted without it.
A survey of 150 practitioners rated how much each of the first four agent questions matters and how well their current enterprise models answer it. Every one fell short, and the widest gap was on the envelope.
Specification v2.0, PDF pp. 4, 29, 38, 194, 282
03
Three planes, four answers
One authority, described on three planes; every change to the enterprise model is checked to keep the three descriptions in agreement.
The source of authority
Design plane
The enterprise model, extended with a layer that describes its agents: what the organisation says they may do. That statement counts as approved, because it is the organisation’s own.
Bridge 1 · authority forward. Charters, what an agent may do and who answers for it, become the run-time envelope. The humans they name approve.
Bridge 2 · evidence back. Each decision returns to the charter behind it.
Where authority is served
Execution plane
The substrate: a live store of facts and rules an agent queries at the moment of acting. Most facts are observed, reported by systems, agents and people; the envelope, the line an agent may not cross, is set only by human approval.
Its portable form
Boundary plane
Your substrate and a partner’s. No approver serves both sides.
When an agent asks whether it may act, the execution plane gives exactly one of four answers. Each has its own remedy.
- Permit
- The agent acts. The decision is logged with the facts it rested on.
- Deny
- The agent stops. No human lifts it on the spot: it reflects an approved rule, or a condition the action needs that does not hold, and lifting it means changing what the model records.
- Escalate
- A limit is crossed or a person is required; the human the model names decides.
- Unwarranted
- The evidence is missing, out of date, ambiguous or too weak for the substrate to stand behind an answer; it says so instead of defaulting to permit or deny. Look again, or ask a human, whose answer is recorded as a new fact.
Four-valued answers exist elsewhere. What Charterion adds is the named human behind escalate and the warrant behind unwarranted: the evidence the substrate can show for its answer. Weaker evidence can only move an answer towards unwarranted.
Specification v2.0, PDF pp. 26‑91
04
Six layers, from purpose to grant
The planes say where a question about an agent is asked; the agent’s five questions say what is asked. Version 2.0 adds the axis every architect works on: what the enterprise model describes.
- Derives: purpose
L0 Motivation & Strategy
Which goal? Whose duty?
Elements: Goal, obligation, constraint
Owner: Principal; architecture board
Kept, now checked
- Derives: designation
L1 Business
Which steps go to agents?
Elements: Role, step, agentic or reserved
Owner: Domain authority; principal
Kept, now checked
- Derives: charter
L2 Agency the core layer
May it act, and how far?
Elements: Agent, charter, delegation, guards
Owner: Agency architect
New layer
- Derives: need, tool
L3 Application
Through which tool?
Elements: Resource, tool, effect level
Owner: Domain authority
Kept, plus tools
- Derives: stays in scope
L4 Data & Knowledge
What does it remember, and who can read it?
Elements: Memory and its scope; assertion store, decision log
Owner: Substrate owner
Kept, plus stores
- Derives: node, grant
L5 Technology / Agentic Runtime
Run where? Who can stop it?
Elements: Node, gateway, model endpoint, policy point, halt
Owner: Agent platform team; substrate owner
Kept, plus controls
-
Warrant / Trust
Provenance, confidence, validity and status on every fact.
-
Governance
Roles, gates and the defects the organisation accepts.
-
Boundary
What crosses the organisation’s edge.
The order of the layers is the order authority is derived in:
purposedesignated stepcharterneedtoolnodegrant
A charter is grounded in a step the business has handed to agents, under a goal or an obligation. It yields a need on a resource, served through a tool that exposes the resource at an effect level, reached from a runtime node under an entitlement. What the agent remembers between actions must stay within the charter’s scope. Each break in the chain is reported on its own, so an architect can say where an agent’s authority stops being realised.
A difference of degree
Motivation, business and application keep their classical element types and gain a reading: a requirement becomes an obligation a check reads, assigning a role to a step becomes a designation, and an interface an agent can call becomes a tool with an effect level.
A difference in kind
Three things have no classical element: the agency layer as a whole; the assertion store and decision log, the repository as part of the estate it describes; and the controls of the runtime, from enforcement points to a halt held by a named human.
What version 2.0 checks on the new elements
- Justified tool exposure
- A tool bound to an agent exposes each resource only at a level the agent needs.
- Scoped memory
- No agent reads a memory holding content it has no need on, a scoped memory holds nothing its scope does not require, and two agents write one memory only in a declared order.
- Mediated write
- Every tool that can change a record passes an enforcement point whose decisions come from the approved envelope.
- Approved model endpoint
- The model that serves an autonomous agent is approved for that level; one that serves an agent able to commit changes should be approved for commit.
- Reachable halt
- The person who oversees an autonomous agent holds a control that stops it on every node it runs on.
- Contained hosting
- Every agent runs inside each containment zone, such as a sandbox, it is required to run in.
- Declared deployment
- Every hosting, serving, routing and tool binding observed at run time is declared in the model.
The specification catalogues 43 building blocks, 13 of them new in v2.0, and ten patterns, from planner and executor to kill-switch and approved-model routing; each of the seven checks is satisfied or made checkable by at least one pattern. It also names what the checks catch in systems that already run.
Five anti-patterns it names
- Agent as service account
- Grants with no charter behind them. Once the agent is chartered, they surface as shadow grants.
- Ungated MCP server
- Tools that change records, reachable with no enforcement point on the path.
- Shared unscoped memory
- An agent reads, through a colleague’s memory, what no grant lets it read.
- Orchestrator without charter
- Work dispatched under the orchestrator’s identity instead of a delegation.
- Halt on paper
- An overseer is named but holds no control on the nodes the agent runs on.
Opt-in, and additive
- The new checks run only on a slice that declares the layered profile. A model written for 1.x is a 2.0 model with the same results; no earlier rule changes.
- The specification does not claim six is the only defensible number of layers, or that any runtime element is new as a concept: vendor reference architectures name every one. What it adds is the element, the check that reads it and the evidence behind it.
- It has no semantic, orchestration or experience layer.
Specification v2.0, PDF pp. 6, 29, 41‑42, 160‑161, 190‑224, 234
05
“Identity management already does this.”
Before the answer: a charter and a level
Every authority an agent holds begins as a charter: the organisation’s statement that the agent may act within a business scope (a capability, a process or a single step), up to a level, under an accountable human, with validity and review dates.
The four levels
- Read
- Observe a resource.
- Propose
- Prepare a change that a person or an authorised agent commits.
- Commit
- Change the resource, each change confirmed or reversible under a declared procedure.
- Autonomous
- Change without per-action confirmation; admissible only under a named human able to halt the agent.
Commit and autonomous are the write levels. The same four words are used when the model is designed, when the agent runs and when its authority is handed to another organisation, so all three speak of one thing.
The model links the scope to the permission:
capabilityprocessstepresourceentitlement
A capability is delivered by processes, a process by steps; each step touches resources at a level, and an agent chartered for the step needs an entitlement on each of them at that level. The entitlement a system enforces is worked out from the charter’s scope by following that chain through the enterprise model, then provisioned from the model into identity management. A grant no step needs is a shadow grant; a need with no grant is an agent that fails in production. Narrowing the charter narrows the entitlement; and an agent that hands work to another agent can pass on no more authority than it holds.
The specification’s granularity rule: read and propose charters may be broad, a capability or a process. Commit and autonomous charters should be as narrow as the steps that need them, and a write charter on a whole capability must be recorded with the reason a narrower scope was not possible.
Specification v2.0, PDF pp. 34‑54, 87, 152
06
Every write-level charter names a human
That name is the first condition a tool checks on every change to the enterprise model. What follows is the rest of what the model says about the people around an agent.
- Accountable principal
- The person a charter names, or a role someone currently holds. An expired charter grants no authority. One past its review date grants one level less.
- Reserved step
- A step the business keeps for people, declared in the model. Agents may read it and propose changes to it; none may hold write authority over it. A write-level charter that reaches one is reported as a defect and repaired at the charter itself: narrowed, split, or lowered to propose there.
- Reachable oversight
- Every write-level agent has a named person, in post today, who decides its escalations; every autonomous agent has one who can halt it. The organisation caps how many agents one person watches.
- Escalation
- When the answer is escalate, the decision goes to the human the model names for that agent: its escalation human, else its overseer, else its principal. A refused agent may ask for more authority. Before anyone reads the request, the tool works out what the model would look like if it were granted and turns back, on its own, a request that would among other things leave an agent unaccountable, breach a separation of duties or give it write authority over a reserved step. Any other request goes to the principal who would answer for it.
Observed and approved
- Agents may update the model, but what they observe grants no authority. Only what a human has approved does, and no agent approves.
Specification v2.0, PDF pp. 34‑35, 49‑54, 72, 86‑88, 90, 93‑94
07
After the answer: the loops
Three loops, each triggered by the events it governs, replace the project cycle.
Design loop · every change to the enterprise model
- 1Gather the facts.
- 2Write charters.
- 3Analyse: a program tests every condition the model must satisfy; each failure is a defect.
- 4Fix or accept each defect.
- 5Provision from the enterprise model; no agent receives an entitlement before this step.
Operation loop · every action
- 1Observe: systems, agents and people report what is there.
- 2Reconcile: resolve names and conflicting reports.
- 3Approve: the humans who answer for each agent approve the rules it is checked against and the record of who owns what agents share; nothing else needs approval.
- 4Decide: permit, deny or escalate each request, or answer unwarranted.
- 5Log, append-only.
- 6Detect drift: compare each decision with what the estate later showed, and re-rate the sources behind it.
Boundary loop · per relationship
- 1Declare exposure: what partner agents may reach.
- 2Issue mandates: the authority an agent carries across the boundary, capped by its charter.
- 3Transact.
- 4Re-estimate trust from commitments kept and broken.
Every decision is attributed to the charter that authorised it, and each charter accumulates its permits, denials, escalations, unwarranted answers and reversals. That record crosses the second bridge, evidence back, into the design loop, where a review narrows or widens the charter, or raises it one level. Raising must clear thresholds the governance board sets; the level can be lowered at any time.
A defect the organisation chooses to live with is recorded with an owner and a review date, and is reported again when that date passes.
Specification v2.0, PDF pp. 71, 84‑92, 103
08
Across an organisational boundary
When an agent deals with another organisation, neither side’s approvers can approve for the other. Authority has to travel with the agent.
- Mandate
- A signed, human-issued statement of authority: what the agent may do abroad, with whom, within what limits, until when; never more than it holds at home.
- Exposure
- What an organisation lets foreign agents see and do, approved by its own people only; five levels, from closed to settling payments.
- Trust weight
- Each side discounts the other’s claims by a weight it alone sets, from commitments kept and broken.
The action proceeds only if both sides find it admissible; each side decides its own escalations. Under the layer model a partner’s server, tool or memory is an exposure too, like any record the partner opens.
Specification v2.0, PDF pp. 74‑76, 92, 194
09
“TOGAF is already in place.”
Adopted beside what you already run
Charterion is adopted as an ArchiMate profile: it labels elements already in your repository as agents and charters, without changing the language or the tools that read it. An agent is still drawn as an application component, so existing repositories stay valid, but it reads as an element whose meaning is authority: its charters belong to the agency layer, and the machine that runs it to the runtime layer. Every phase of the three loops above has a place in TOGAF’s Architecture Development Method, the ADM, the cycle a TOGAF shop already runs and keeps. Two habits change for the part of the estate agents work in: a target conformance level takes the place of a target architecture, and the board’s review of solutions becomes gates in each charter’s life, run by tools on every change.
The unit of adoption, conformance and reporting is the slice: a bounded set of capabilities or processes, their resources and the agents chartered on them.
Five stages a slice climbs, in order of adoption
- 0Documented
- 1Inventoried
- 2Analysed
- 3Governed
- 4Coherent
Conformance is claimed slice by slice, on three scales: D0-D4 for the enterprise model, Levels 0-4 for the live service an agent asks before it acts, X0-X4 for what another organisation’s agents may find and do. A published Conformance Statement records each level and the defects the organisation chose to accept. No agent may be given authority to write to a system on a slice below Level 3 on that live-service scale.
Version 2.0 adds no level, scale or stage. A slice that opts into the layered checks says so in its statement and names who owns each layer; the checks are recommended once the slice’s model is well formed and required at no level, and a statement written under 1.x stays valid at the same levels.
What it costs
- Stating which resources each step touches is the substantive modelling effort.
- The architecture board must accept that a rule it approves will refuse an agent.
- The checks run in the version-controlled pipeline a software team already has.
- Opting into the layered checks means declaring each agent’s tools, memories and runtime, mostly read from catalogues and inventories the platform team already keeps. Expect the first run to report findings about how agents were actually deployed.
What it is not
- Not an identity-and-access-management product, a policy engine or an agent runtime: it computes what they enforce and reads their logs.
- Not a code generator: agents consult the model.
- Not a replacement for TOGAF or ArchiMate.
- Not a binder of written controls: every control is a condition a program evaluates.
- Not an enforcement mechanism: threat modelling, credential mechanics, the interception of tool calls at run time and the inner design of agents are left to the work it relies on. It tells those mechanisms what to enforce and why.
- Not a compliance framework or legal advice.
Specification v2.0, PDF pp. 26‑27, 85, 96‑97, 105, 116‑118, 165‑167, 234, 248, 252, 256‑257
10
“It has not been tried on a real organisation.”
How far it has been tested, and on what terms
The specification says so itself, and names what would change it: a field study run by independent architects in three organisations in different sectors, at least one of them public.
Evidence
- Built
- In a 2026 research programme, reported in five articles.
- Grounded
- In a survey of 150 practitioners.
- Demonstrated
- On five fictitious sector cases written by the author: an insurer, a retail bank, a teaching hospital, a benefits agency and a cloud-platform operations team, every figure computed from the shipped case files. Version 2.0 adds to each case the tools, memories and runtime its agents would use, also written by the author.
- Tested on synthetic models
- 450 of 450 planted defects found; the largest model, 581,121 facts, analysed in 14.5 seconds. The version 2.0 checks found 300 of 300 planted defects, and a 58,906-fact model was analysed in under a second.
- Checked by machine
- Five properties of the core are re-proved in Lean 4, a proof assistant that checks every step; the rest stand on written proofs. A second rule engine, Soufflé, reproduces the reference results on 492 of 492 models, and on 341 of 341 for the version 2.0 rules.
- Open to other tools
- A public benchmark of 923 models with their expected results lets any tool be scored against the reference. No other tool has been scored yet.
- Served live
- A reference service answers agents at the moment of acting over MCP, the protocol agents use to call tools: 224 of 224 scripted episodes gave the predicted answer. No organisation’s systems are connected to it.
- Run on others’ models
- Three public ArchiMate models written by others: the ArchiSurance teaching case and two public-sector reference architectures, GEMMA and EIRA. The charters on them are the author’s, and none is the repository of a running organisation.
- Not yet
- It has not been used on any real organisation’s architecture repository, nor has any organisation used the version 2.0 layer checks. Until then the author’s word for it is “candidate”: a proposal awaiting field evidence.
Terms
- Licence
- Source-available: the document under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, the implementation under PolyForm Noncommercial 1.0.0. Research, teaching, standardisation work, evaluation, personal study, and non-profit or public-sector use count as non-commercial.
- Commercial use
- By or for a for-profit organisation in its operations, in paid consulting, training or certification, or in a product or service offered for a fee: a written licence from the author, granted on request.
- Contributing
- Corrections, worked cases, extension profiles, mappings to other frameworks and implementations, each signed off as the contributor’s own to give. Contributors keep copyright and are credited; the grant lets the author keep one canonical Charterion and license it commercially.
- Standardisation
- The non-commercial licence is not meant to be permanent. The author intends to license, free and on request, tools that implement the conformance checks and state their conformance publicly, and to license the specification royalty-free to a recognised standards body or consortium that adopts it. These intentions bind only once confirmed in a written licence.
Specification v2.0, PDF pp. 2‑8, 36, 119‑120, 123, 169‑188